Charles de Gaulle's failure to deal with the many problems that faced France in the late 1960s would eventually lead to his downfall. He was a definite hard-liner who took extreme risks to his party and the whole government of France, yet he knew when moderation was needed, and how to get popular support mobilized behind him. When his actions and choices in his leadership did not reflect his arrogance, they reflected his brilliance with the management of political capital, and ensured his popular support.

His leadership was both a great failure and a great success. Students' protests forced total work stoppages and riots in the streets due to his tactics against protestors. Radicals would be pushed farther, and would grab hold to parts of French society. President de Gaulle would find himself making a bet over constitutional reforms, which led to his resignation.

Yet, he was not a total failure. While many of France's people found themselves in revolt against President de Gaulle's party in May 1968, his party would win the largest majority of parliament seats in June. Without his strategies to end protests and strikes, and without appealing to moderates, French government may have very well have collapsed to revolutionaries.

The Failing French Education System

By 1968, not only was France's economy collapsing and lagging behind England and America, its once great higher education system was in the same trouble. Population had exploded filling France's colleges far quicker then it could afford to build or expand existing ones. Students where often cramped in large lecture halls and residences, and professors were not always of the highest quality. University population tripled between 1962 and 1968 in France, while funding for new buildings and professors only doubled (Steeran 1).

This would have upset the students enough, but it was President de Gaulle administration's search for a revenue source to pay for a university spending that upset them more. Increasingly, universities started to rely on corporate donations and research funds to pay for the great expense of universities. This infuriated much of the radical student body; they felt that big business was starting to get a monopoly on thought in colleges, instead of the economy paying attention to the innovative research of students (Bourges 4).

From Small Protests to Full-Scale Riots

The axis powers during World War II posed a totally different challenge then the protestors in the late 1960s. While a hard-line approach with a full military force worked while he was general in charge, against the invading axis powers, it could not even be considered for dealing with protestors. This would require a very different approach that would be difficult with his hard-line arrogant attitude that was typical of decisions that President de Gaulle would too often make in May of 1968.

President de Gaulle's hard-line approach was incompatible with the student radicalism in a during the 1960. Students and protestors were not interested in full-scale war, but were interested in getting their demands and their voices heard. They had extreme demands of citizen, student, and worker power, which President de Gaulle rapidly dismissed (Daniels 150). These demands would continue to become more radical, as they tended to feed off feelings that government and society as a whole were oppressing students.

When students took to the streets, the Paris police, nor the riot police, Compagnies Republica de Secuité (CRS) were unprepared for them (Daniels 148). The protestors had weapons of cobblestones, Molotov cocktails, overturned cars, barricades and themselves, while the CRS riot police only had limited resources like tear gas and clubs which they could use. While the CRS held back extensively from hurting students (they were not authorized to use deadly force), they were still were not afraid to use force (Ford 2).

Unlike previous protests, on the May 3 protest, the police did not hold back. When the CRS moved in to break up initial protests, they did not hold back from attacking protesting students, bystanders, and the media. The police also responded with truncheons and tear gas, "which only magnified the protest" (Daniels 150). Radicals started to feel as if they were only protesting, but also as if they were fighting a war against the tyrannical French government.

This instantly caused students who where not committed to the revolution to see the evils of the police, and to pledge their support. To quote historian Robert H. Daniels, "[within] a few minutes a mass movement was created" in reaction to the police's actions (150). It had gone from small-scale riots, to thousands of students and workers protesting de Gaulle's actions. Leaders of professors and student unions were instantly demanding a full-scale strikes and protests to start on Monday, May 6. Charles de Gaulle handled these protests poorly. His choices to send in riot police, and break them up, only forced protestors to become more radicalized.

Understanding the Protestors

The students and later the workers had long lists of demands. President de Gaulle did not try to figure out what they all meant. Like socialists in many other parts of the world, they appealed to peoples' feelings, yet left little of a plan to implement their ideas. Government works on rules and laws that have to be codified and thought out, while protestors only need catchy slogans and emotional appeals.

Protestors did not even want to have relations with the government; they did not want any changes to happen in the Gaullist government to make ideas a reality. In the words of Jacques Savgeot, towards the end of May 1968, "As for us, our position is clear, [there will be] no negotiations with the government". He also goes on to say, all parliamentary debates are boring', and they are ineffective in dealing with the challenges that society poses today (Bourges 11). The attitude that reflected the mood of the protestors was best summed up by graffiti painted on a wall in Paris: "Be realistic, demand the impossible" (Ford 2).

Economic Issues Not Dealt With Fuel the General Strike

By 1968, France was far behind both United States and Britain economically. While both of those countries found themselves prosperous with time and money for leisure, France was not so lucky. Five thousand adults could not find jobs, and were receiving unemployment money from the government. Radical Daniel Cohn-Bendit went further to estimate that as many as 400,000 recent graduates of the late 1960s could not find jobs (Bourges 53). People typically were forced to work 9 hours a day, or 45-46 hours a week. That is more then an hour more then people in the United States and Britain worked. Both countries had laws that encouraged a 40 hours work week, while France did not (52).

People in France found themselves drifting between jobs; layoffs were common in this era. Over a quarter of all workers made less then 500 francs per month. This equals around $2.25 an hour, in current inflation adjusted dollars. 500 Francs a month equals about 27% of the 1968 United States minimum wage. Some made less then 400 francs a month or $1.76 and hour current USD (Streeran 1; Triacom 1). Trade unions saw their membership declining from 7 million to 3 million, under tough anti-union polices of President de Gaulle (Streeran 1).

It is understandable why all these conditions would push people to radicalism, street fighting, and work stoppages. Unlike the student riots in America, the protests in France included not only students but also many adults who were unsatisfied by the working conditions. The adult-student coalition could only be explained by the economic problems of the time, no such thing happened in the United States. Students and workers in the United States in the late 1960s were often on opposite sides of the issues, as demonstrated with the Hard Hat Riots in New York City in 1970.

On May 13, 1968, workers responded in a major way to the economic problems they faced, with 10-12 million of them participated in a general strike (Ford 1; Streeran 1). Protestors would occupy over 122 French factories (Streeran 1). For weeks, workers protesting effectively stopped France's business. Yet President de Gaulle was no where to be found. He was on a trip to Romania, which lasted to May 18. According to some radicals, the intention of his trip was to get out of France to save his life.

Softing His Hard-Line Image

After the events of May of 1968, many people feared for the survival of the French government. President de Gaulle saw himself losing the respect of the people, and more importantly, the control of France he had for years. It appeared to many people that figures of authority and stability were undetermined as the results of the protests and strikes (Ford 3). He knew that he had to appeal to the moderate elements of French society for his government to succeed. On Friday, May 24, President de Gaulle went on television to say:

"[France needs] more extensive participation of everyone in the conduct and the results of the activities that directly concern them... [There is need for a] mandate for renewal and adaptation" (qtd. in Streean 6).

Many people were quite surprised by this speech, and the radicals rapidly lost their legitimacy. The next Monday, the 27th, he announced he was giving into the demands of the industrial strike, and promised workers an 35% increase in the minimum wage for industrial workers, and an a 10% wage increase for other workers (9).

Yet, while those measures pleased many of the moderates in French society, they radicals could not be pleased nearly that easily. In Paris people where still calling for a "government of the people," and posters hung around the town reflected that view (7). The Wednesday after his May 24 speech, President de Gaulle left the spotlight in France to visit the headquarters of the French army in eastern France and West Germany, to discuss his future plans. He wanted to have absolute military support, to keep his government in power, hold elections and bring peace to France (Daniels 159).

The day after meeting with the military and discussing his plans, President de Gaulle announced France would have parliamentary elections within 40 days. It was clearly an effort to get the appearance of popular support behind his party. It would be a risk to his party, the Union for the Defense of the Republic, to call elections during such a revolutionary period. It would possibly threaten his party's control of parliament and his position as President, but he calculated conservative factions would keep it in the power (159). He did everything in his power to ensure that such elections would run smoothly, and that the vast majority of strikes and protested would be end before that point. To make sure his party would be successful, he quickly denounced the crisis as being the fault of communists, and put down any remaining street demonstrations.

After the elections of June 23, the decision to hold elections proved to be a wise choice. The Union for the Defense of the Republic now controlled the parliament by a strong majority, more then they had ever before. It would send a clear signal to the public and to the party leaders, that they were still very much in control of the country. It looked like President Charles de Gaulle had escaped the rough weeks of May and early June politically unharmed. By late June, France had calmed down, and few radicals dared to protest (Streeran 8).

Fallout After the Revolution

A year later, President de Gaulle was determined to prevent future protests, by dealing with the problems France faced. After seeing the results of the June 23, 1968 parliamentary election, he believed that he was almost invincible. One such attempt was to pass a constitutional proposal that would call for reform of the Senate, responding to complaints of protestors that the current system of electing representatives to the parliament was not democratic. After the parliamentary elections of June 1968, he believed the people would support him and any such legislation that he supported.

He was so determined to reform the Senate, that he promised to step down from being President if the people did not pass this proposal. Unfortunately for him, voters rejected the proposal by 52.1%, and he was forced to resign on April 23, 1969. Former Union for the Defense of the Republic leader, Pompidou took his place as the President of France (Daniels 160). Charles de Gaulle would continue to live for another two years in retirement, and writing his memoirs. He died on November 8, 1970, due to a heart attack (Foundation 5).

President Charles de Gaulle handled the revolutionaries arrogantly, and in many instances took risks, that could have threatened his whole party and even the whole government of France. A hard line approach to everything pushed small-scale protests to full-scale riots, protests, and work stoppages. It seemed that by the end of May, he had gotten his political strategy together, and by June of 1968, it paid off. Yet in the end, his hard-line approach and his belief in his popular support led to his downfall.

Works Cited

Bourges, Herve. The French Student Revolt: The Leaders Speak. New York: Hill and Wang, 1968.

Daniels, Robert V. Year of the Heroic Guerilla: World Revolution and Counter Revolution in 1968. New York: Basic, 1989.

Charles de Gaulle Foundation. "Biography of Charles de Gaulle: The Statesman Ô62-68." Charles de Gaulle Foundation. 21 Oct. 2002. <http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/en/facts/biography/bio_04.htm>

Ford, Peter. "The French Look Back at May '68". The Christian Science Monitor. Boston. (May 8, 1998).

Streeran, Dermot. France: The General Strike of 1968. 21 Oct. 2002. <http://www.cat.org.au/aprop/may68.txt>

Triacom Translation Services. "Historical Currency Exchange Rates" 21 Oct. 2002. Triacom Translation Services, Inc. (2002) <http://www.triacom.com/archive/exchange.en.html>